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Abstract 
In August 2007, Fortis Group, Belgium’s largest bank, acquired the Dutch operations of ABN 
AMRO, becoming the fifth largest bank in Europe. Despite its size and its significant 
operations in the Benelux countries, Fortis struggled to integrate ABN AMRO. Fortis’s 
situation worsened with the crash of the US subprime market, which impacted its subprime 
mortgage portfolio. By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, its stock had lost 70% of 
its value, and it was on the verge of collapse due to a severe liquidity crisis. The governments 
of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands quickly came together and agreed to inject 
funding into the bank to keep it afloat. However, the deal fell apart when the Netherlands 
reversed course and nationalized Fortis’s Dutch assets. As a result, Fortis underwent an 
uncoordinated resolution, bifurcated along national lines. This case permits examination of 
this attempt at a cross-border rescue of a failing, systemically important financial institution, 
analysis of why the effort failed, and consideration of how it might proceed differently under 
current regulations.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This module is one of four produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) considering the 
European Banking Union. Other modules are: 
• European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism  
• European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism 
• European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises. 
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability. 
3 Economist, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt/Main Financial Stability Department and Research Department. 
This co-author’s contribution represents her personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.  
4 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Program Director, Yale School of Management. 
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1. Introduction  
On October 17, 2007, Fortis SA/NV(Fortis), Belgium’s largest bank, partnered with the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander in a €72 billion deal to purchase ABN AMRO, a large 
but troubled Dutch bank. As a result, Fortis took over the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO 
and was transformed into Europe’s fifth-largest bank with a strong presence in the Benelux 
countries (i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It was widely thought that the 
three banks overpaid for ABN AMRO, and Fortis soon began to struggle from the effects of 
the acquisition on its balance sheet. Its troubles were exacerbated as its mortgage portfolio 
was impacted by the crash of the US subprime market. 
By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, and its stock had lost 70% of its value. By 
September of 2008, the bank was on the verge of collapse as it experienced a severe liquidity 
crisis. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands came together and 
agreed to inject €11.2 billion into the bank. However, the deal fell apart when the 
Netherlands suddenly reversed course and nationalized Fortis’s Dutch assets. As a result, 
Fortis underwent an uncoordinated resolution along national lines, with the Belgian and 
Luxembourg governments pursuing different strategies than the Dutch government.  
In this module, readers will examine the attempted cross-border resolution of Fortis. 
Readers should seek to identify weaknesses in the effort that might be avoided or minimized 
so as to achieve a more effective, coordinated result in the future. They should also seek to 
identify incentives that might strengthen cross-border resolution cooperation.  
The rest of this module is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the Fortis 
Group. Section 3 discusses the ABN AMRO acquisition. Section 4 describes the difficulty that 
Fortis had in integrating the ABN AMRO assets. Section 5 describes the joint resolution 
attempt and its dissolution. Section 6 concerns the regulatory reviews and events that 
occurred after the first resolution attempt, and Section 7 introduces some conclusions about 
what has been learned from the Fortis situation.  
Questions 
1. Should the Dutch, Belgian, and/or Luxembourg governments have done more to 
prevent or delay the acquisition of ABN AMRO, given the economic climate? What 
type of tools would they have needed?  
2. Could the new European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SRM) have prevented the 
Fortis collapse?  
3. What prompted the different responses from the Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourg 
governments?  
4. Did the governments act purely out of self-interest? Did they comply with the letter 
and spirit of European Union (EU) law?  
5. What were the different strategies used by the Belgian and Dutch governments, and 
their results for depositors, counter-parties, shareholders, and taxpayers?  
6. How do these results compare to what might have been achieved through a 
coordinated resolution under the new SRM?  
7. Would the SRM have resulted in a more effective or simpler resolution?  
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8. What were the roles of the European Central Bank and the European Commission in 
the resolution? 
2. History of Fortis 
The Fortis Group was created in 1990 when AMEV, a large Dutch insurer merged with VSB 
Group, a Dutch banking group, and then later that same year joined with AG Group, a Belgian 
insurer. The resulting company operated in both Belgium and the Netherlands through a 
complicated holding company structure and various subsidiaries. The transaction was the 
first cross-border merger in the European financial services industry and was heralded as a 
realization of the EU single market. In the following years, Fortis grew organically and 
through a series of aggressive acquisitions.  
Beginning in 1998, Fortis’s two parent companies adopted identical management structures 
in an effort to better unify the company. Several additional initiatives were taken in the 
following years, including the switch to a single Board of Directors in September 2000,5 the 
launch in December 2001 of the single Fortis share—a new financial instrument that 
combined the shares of the two parent companies6—and in 2004, the amendment of the two 
parent companies’ Articles of Association in order to create a more internationally oriented 
Board of Directors headed by a single Chairman (Fortis 2006, 247).  
By 2006, Fortis operated as a unified multinational business. However, its two parent 
companies, Fortis SA/NV (Belgium) and Fortis N.V. (the Netherlands), retained their 
independent status. Each was separately registered in its home country and prepared its 
own financial statement in accordance with the legal and regulatory requirements of its 
home country. Together, the group also published a consolidated financial statement as 
required by Belgian law and a joint report of the Board of Directors of both parent 







5 “The governance structure of Fortis is such that a Fortis Board meeting is always a ‘two-in-one’ event. Anyone 
observing such a meeting would see Board members participating in a single meeting to discuss issues and take 
decisions that relate to Fortis. From a legal point of view, however, two meetings have taken place” (Fortis 
Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 9). 
6 “When purchasing a Fortis share, shareholders effectively acquire a unit that comprises one ordinary Fortis 
SA/NA share and one ordinary Fortis N.V. share. As a consequence of this ‘Twinned Share Principle,’ the 
number of Fortis Shares issued is always equal to the number of Fortis SA/NV shares issued and also the 
number of Fortis N.V. shares issued. The Twinned Share Principle of Fortis is truly unique. It implies that a 
single unit represents a share in two legal entities, each with a different nationality. Shareholders have voting 
rights in both parent companies and may choose to receive a wholly Belgian-sourced or a wholly Dutch-sourced 
dividend” (Fortis Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 13). 
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Figure 1: Fortis Parent Structure 
 
Source: Fortis Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 9. 
Aggressive Growth 
The Benelux countries were Fortis’s home base and its strongest markets. However by 2007, 
Fortis had grown its business to operate in over 50 countries with almost 57,000 employees. 
Fortis operated in two segments: banking and insurance.  
Figure 2: Fortis Substructure 
  
Source: Fortis Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 10. 
Fortis’s banking operations included retail banking, offering a variety of deposit, credit, and 
investment financial services to individuals and small businesses. Fortis also offered 
merchant and private banking services to a variety of clients, including large international 
companies, medium-sized enterprises, public sector entities, and high-net-worth 
individuals.  
Fortis’s insurance business offered a variety of products, including life, healthcare, and 
disability insurance products, as well as mortgage and savings instruments. Besides 
branches of Fortis Bank, the company sold these products through a variety of channels, such 
as independent agents, brokers, and financial planners (Fortis 2006, 111-112).  
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As shown in Figure 3, in 2007, after the ABN AMRO acquisition, Fortis reported $121 billion 
in revenue and a record $5.5 billion profit, on assets of $1 trillion.  
Regulation and Supervision 
Fortis was subject to regulatory supervision at the consolidated level and at the individual 
operating company level. At the consolidated level, the Belgian Banking, Finance, and 
Insurance Commission and De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank [DCB]) 
supervised Fortis jointly. Since its banking activities, headquartered in Brussels, were the 
largest part of the organization, the Belgian authority was considered the “consolidating and 
coordinating supervisor” (primary) for EU purposes. Fortis’s banking subsidiaries had to 
comply with the regulations in the countries where they operated (Fortis 2006, 87). The 
group was listed on the Euronext Brussels, Euronext Amsterdam, and Luxembourg stock 
exchanges and had a sponsored ADR program in the United States.  
Later, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would find that “Fortis was deemed to 
be systemically relevant in the three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), 
not only because of its large positions in domestic markets, but also because of its function 
as a clearing member at several major domestic and foreign stock exchanges” (Basel 
Committee 2010, 16). As shown in Figure 4, the size of Fortis’ balance sheet exceeded that of 
Belgium and the Netherlands, which would prove challenging when the bank needed 
assistance. 
Figure 3: Fortis Key Indicators 2005-08 








Equity as % 
 assets Employees 
2005 75,518 4,177 5.5% 775,636 19,525 2.5 50,846 
2006 112,351 4,896 4.4% 859,900 22,328 2.6 54,245 
2007 121,202 5,459 4.5% 1,022,256 27,222 2.7 56,886 
2008 164,887 5,467 3.3% 1,273,717 48,317 3.8 62,009 
*All numbers in millions of US dollars. Source: Fortune Global 500 available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/snapshots/532.html. 
 
Figure 4: Fortis Group Assets vs. Belgium and The Netherlands GDPs 2005-08 
Year Assets* Assets as % of Belgium GDP Assets as % of Netherlands GDP 
2005 775,636 252 145 
2006 859,900 212 125 
2007 1,022,256 190 112 
2008 1,273,717 285 166 
*All numbers in millions of US dollars. Source: Fortune Global 500 available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/snapshots/532.html. 
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3. The ABN AMRO Acquisition 
In October 2007, Fortis acquired the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO, the second-largest 
Dutch bank, as part of a three-party consortium that included the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), as lead, and the Banco Santander (Spain) (See Fortis, RBS and Santander 2007 for the 
offer details). At the time, ABN AMRO was listed in the Fortune Global 500 as the 15th largest 
bank in the world. ABN AMRO had operations in 63 countries and 110,000 employees.  
The bid by the consortium was a hostile one. The ABN AMRO board had preferred an offer 
by Barclays, largely because of Barclays’s intent to maintain most of the bank intact. The 
Barclays offer also was surprisingly favored by the Dutch Central Bank, according to press 
reports in February of 2007 (See Treanor 2007). Just as Barclay’s exclusive period expired, 
the consortium made a higher bid but proposed breaking up the bank. The consortium’s bid 
was favored by The Children’s Investment Fund Management (TCI) hedge fund, a major ABN 
AMRO shareholder. With TCI’s support, the consortium secured a favorable vote at the 
shareholders’ meeting.  
Figure 5: The Acquisition of ABN AMRO 
Entity Royal Bank of Scotland Fortis Group Banco Santander 




operations + global 
warehouse customers 
Dutch operations, including the private 
banking and asset management functions + 
commercial and mortgage loan divisions. 





United Kingdom Belgium/the Netherlands Spain 
Supervisor 
Bank of England Belgian Banking, Finance, and Insurance 
Commission, Dutch Ministry of Finance + 
Dutch Central Bank 
Bank of Spain 
Source: Algemene Rekenkamer 2009-10. 
 
In the end, the Consortium bid €71 billion for ABN AMRO, an amount that many analysts 
believed was too high (See Figure 5). 
Fortis put up €24 billion (cash). The bank financed its participation “through the issuance of 
new shares, convertible bonds, hybrid instruments, divestment and capital relief 
transactions (securitizations)… In addition, it arranged a borrowing facility of €10 billion as 
bridging financing” (DCB, Fortis Letter, 5). In exchange, Fortis took over ABN AMRO’s Dutch 
operations, including the private banking and asset management functions, strengthening 
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Approval by the Dutch Authorities 
Because the proposed transaction would combine the first and fourth largest banks in the 
Dutch commercial banking market, it was subject to review and approval by the DCB, which 
was also the bank supervisor, and the Dutch Ministry of Finance. Both Fortis N.V. 
(Netherlands) and ABN AMRO were of vital importance to the Dutch financial sector because 
of their size, the nature of their activities, and their roles in the interbank market and 
payments.  
The DCB found that problems at either or both institutions could have generated system-
wide effects, and that those effects could be intensified with the consolidation of the two 
entities.7 The DCB also found that the intended two-to-three-year timeframe for splitting up 
ABN AMRO created the risk that conflicts of interest could develop between the parties, 
causing further stress to the financial industry. The DCB also took special note of the looming 
financial crisis and liquidity problems then being experienced by banks that might negatively 
impact any or all of the involved banks and found that the transaction “could jeopardize the 
financial stability of the nation’s financial sector” (See Appendix A for the DCB’s analysis of 
systemic risk.). 
However, despite its finding of jeopardy, ultimately, the DCB found no legal basis for halting 
the deal. Rather, to mitigate the identified risks, the DCB imposed a number of conditions on 
the consortium.8 On September 17, 2007, it advised the Ministry of Finance to issue a 
declaration of no-objection for the proposed transaction, subject to its stated conditions. The 
Ministry issued a declaration of no-objection the same day (For further details see the DCB 
Fortis Letter and the DCB RBS/Santander Letter).9 
European Commission Approval 
The merger was also required to pass scrutiny under EU merger regulations. Upon review, 
the European Commission concluded that the acquisition of assets by RBS and Santander 
would not impede effective competition in the European Economic Area. However, the 
Commission concluded that the acquisition by Fortis presented competitive issues regarding 
the concentration in commercial banking. The Commission required Fortis to divest certain 
of its commercial banking units before proceeding with the deal. Fortis sold these units at a 
€300 million loss (European Commission, IP/07/1442). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 “From a prudential point of view, an offer by a consortium would constitute a strong risk-increasing and 
complicating factor, both in the preparation of the transaction and in its execution and implementation” 
Treanor 2007.  
8 For example, the Consortium was required to submit a transition plan for approval within 45 days after the 
deal closed DCB RBS/Santander letter, Annex, 2. 
9 The UK Financial Services Authority was also criticized for not taking steps to halt the “calamitous” deal which 
amounted to €27.2 billion on The Royal Bank of Scotland’s part. It was later determined that the deal reduced 
RBS’s capital cushion to just 2%, which precipitated its failure as the financial crisis developed. It had to be 
rescued by the UK government beginning in October 2008. As of year-end 2013, the government had invested 
£45.5 billion (€27.2 billion) and still owned 79% (Herald Scotland, October 2012; www.rbs.com). Additionally, 
in 2013, the FSA was terminated as a separate agency. 
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4. A Difficult Integration 
Soon after the acquisition, Fortis began to struggle. The bank delayed fully integrating ABN 
AMRO assets for several reasons. First, it had acquired a great amount of intangibles that it 
could not put on its balance sheet and would have to write off. Second, if it fully integrated 
ABN AMRO, it would be in danger of no longer satisfying its capital requirements. 
Additionally, it had to contend with the €300 million loss from the EU-required sale of assets 
that it had to recognize. Fortis’s troubles were exacerbated as its subprime mortgage 
portfolio was being impacted by the crash of the US subprime market. 
To finance the purchase, Fortis raised €13.4 billion in October 2007 by issuing extra shares 
to existing shareholders at a discounted price of €15 per share. In November 2007, Fortis 
reported an unexpected decline in third-quarter profits and disclosed that it had “some 
exposure” to the US subprime market through its holdings of mortgage-backed and asset-
backed securities and collateralized debt securities. Despite this, it managed to sell an 
additional €2.5 billion in bonds to help fund the ABN AMRO acquisition. 
However, Fortis’s situation had weakened by June 2008. The bank announced that because 
of the financial crisis it needed to fortify its capital by raising an additional €8.3 billion and 
paying its much coveted dividend in stock instead of cash (saving €1.5 billion). The move 
caused an uproar among shareholders because the dividend had been one of the main selling 
points of the shares. Fortis stock dropped from €12 to €10 on June 26, 2008, and then further 
declined.  
On June 26, 2008, Standard & Poor’s put the company on “credit watch with negative 
implications” citing the bank’s “increasing reliance on weaker forms of capital” (The New 
York Times, 2008A). After further review, on July 17, it lowered the ratings on Fortis’ core 
operating groups and subsidiaries (Reuters, 2008). 
The company finally managed to issue 150 million shares to large investors at €10 a share, 
placing them with Libyan and Chinese investors after giving a 25% discount. Belgian 
shareholders (holding a combined total of 15 percent) were not allowed to participate, a 
situation that was not well-received. 
Despite further attempts to calm the waters, on July 11, 2008, Fortis CEO, Jean-Paul Votron 
stepped down, conceding that the ABN AMRO acquisition had depleted Fortis’s capital.10 Its 
stock closed at just half of what it had been prior to the acquisition. 
During the summer, customers continued to withdraw funds, and Fortis experienced a 
worsening liquidity crisis. By September 2008, Fortis was on the verge of collapse and the 
subject of bankruptcy rumors, no doubt fueled by the September 14 run on Northern Rock 
UK plc (the UK’s first bank run in 150 years) and the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers 
in the US the next day.11 During the last week of September, Fortis’ share price fell 35%, to 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10 Fortis was led by a number of CEOs from 2000-08, which led to a lack of leadership continuity. Anton van 
Rossum joined Fortis as CEO in 2000. Jean-Paul Votron replaced him in 2004 and engineered the company’s 
purchase of ABN AMRO, a company at which he had briefly worked. Votron resigned in July 2008 after the 
company’s stock had lost 70% of its value during the year. He was succeeded by an interim CEO, Harman 
Verwilst, who had been with the company since 2004. Filip Dierckx, who had been responsible for growing 
Fortis’ subprime mortgage business then replaced Verwilst in July 2008. 
11 See YPFS case module, Wiggins, et al. 2014H for a discussion of how incidents in one financial market impact 
those in other countries. 
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hover around €5. On September 25, CEO Harman Verwilst tried to reassure analysts that the 
company was sound, but without offering concrete numbers, he had little impact. He stepped 
down that evening and was replaced by Fillip Dierckx.  
5. The Resolution Attempt 
On Sunday, September 28, 2008, DCB Chief Nout Wellink and Dutch Finance Minister Wouter 
Bos travelled to Brussels for talks with the Belgian government and regulators. The two 
Dutch officials had not considered the meeting a formal get-together but wanted to meet 
with the Belgians about the problems that Fortis was having and to consider solutions. 
Although ING and BNP Paribas had expressed interest in buying the group, no concrete offer 
had been made. 
When Wellink and Bos arrived at the offices of the Belgian minister, to their surprise, there 
was a “war council” in progress. Present were: Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme, Belgian 
Finance Minister Didier Reynders, French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde, European 
Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, Fortis CEO Dierckx and two Fortis directors. The 
talks were well underway, and specific numbers were being discussed (De Standaard 2008). 
The three governments worked out an emergency plan to save Fortis by partially 
nationalizing it, agreeing to inject €11.2 billion into the failing bank. As detailed in Figure 6, 
Belgium would pay €4.7 billion for 49% of the Belgian holding company, which was the 
parent of the Belgian bank and the profitable insurance subsidiary. Luxembourg would pay 
€2.5 billion for 49% of the Luxembourg banking subsidiary. And the Netherlands would 
contribute €4 billion for a 49% interest in the Dutch banking subsidiary (See The Telegraph, 
dated September 28, 2008.). 
Figure 6: Fortis Resolution Plan I (September 28, 2008)  
Country Belgium the Netherlands Luxembourg 
Investment €4.7 billion €4 billion €2.5 billion 
Interests 
Acquired 
49% of Belgian holding 
company including 
Belgian bank and 
insurance businesses 











Central Bank of 
Luxembourg 
 
The Dutch Reversal 
Upon returning home, the Dutch officials grew upset with not having been invited to the 
meeting and with the deal that they had made. They believed that the Belgians were getting 
a better deal, since they would acquire ownership of the lucrative Belgian and Dutch 
insurance subsidiaries. As a result, the Dutch decided to pursue a different strategy. 
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On October 3, the Dutch government announced that it had nationalized Fortis’s Dutch assets 
in order to reassure Dutch depositors and safeguard the country’s financial market. The 
government acquired a 92.6% interest in Fortis Bank Nederland Holding, a 100% interest in 
Fortis Insurance Netherlands N.V., a 100% interest in Fortis Corporate Insurance, and a 70% 
interest in Fortis FBN (H) Preferred Investments BV, paying €16.8 billion for these shares 
(New York Times 2008). The Dutch government also repaid €34 billion in short-term loans 
to Belgian Fortis and accepted liability for €16.1 billion of outstanding long-term loans.12 
Reports indicated that the Netherlands’ government never paid its original commitment, and 
some critics felt that this had contributed to Fortis’s continuing troubles, as it had 
experienced depositors’ withdrawals and lenders unwilling to lend even after the announced 
plan (See the DCB Press Release). 
The Belgian and Luxembourg Response 
In light of the actions of the Dutch government and to stave off a run on Belgian Fortis, the 
Belgian and Luxembourg governments scrambled to regroup. Two days later, on October 5, 
2008, they announced the following “Additional Measures,” amounting to a revamped rescue 
plan: 
• For an additional capital injection of €4.7 billion, the Belgian government would 
acquire additional shares of Fortis Banque Belgium, bringing its total interest to 
99.93%.  
• The Belgian government also agreed to transfer 75% of its interest in the Fortis 
Belgian bank and 67% of the Luxembourg bank to the French bank BNP Paribas for 
€8.25 billion in stock, which was later renegotiated to €11 billion. As a result, it 
retained a 25% interest in Fortis Bank (sufficient to block shareholder action) and 
became a 12% shareholder in BNP Paribas, making the Belgian government its largest 
shareholder.  
• The Luxembourg government would acquire a 1.1% share in BNP Paribas.  
• Since BNP Paribas insisted that it would not take on Fortis’s toxic assets, a portfolio 
of these assets, valued at €10 billion, would be transferred to a special-purpose 
vehicle that would be owned and financed by the Belgian government (24%), BNP 
Paribas (10%) and by Fortis Group, which held the ABN AMRO assets (66%). 
• BNP Paribas would purchase the Belgian insurance activities of the Fortis Group. 
The Fortis Group would continue to own Fortis Insurance International and 66% of the 
structured products vehicle, and it would also benefit from the sale of Fortis Insurance 
Netherlands and Fortis insurance Belgium (Belgium Government, 2008). 
6. The Aftermath and EU State Aid Review 
EU State Aid Review 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
12 In December 2008, the Dutch government also acquired a 33.8% interest in the ABN AMRO assets acquired 
by the Fortis Group as a result of the Consortium purchase for an additional €6.54 billion. The government 
also provided ongoing treasury financing, up to €45 billion, to the Dutch Fortis operations, a function that 
Belgian Fortis had previously served (Algemene Rekenkamer, 6). 
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Under the laws of the EU, the governments of the member states are prohibited from 
injecting funds into private companies so as to give them an unfair advantage. However, the 
laws do recognize that some government assistance may be necessary, and such “state aid” 
is permitted for reasons of general economic development, subject to EU review. 
In reviewing the Fortis situation, the EU Commission found that the actions by the Belgian 
and Luxembourg governments in intervening to support Fortis constituted state aid to the 
benefit of Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg. However, the Commission concluded 
that the aid was compatible with EU laws because it was necessary to save the banks and to 
remedy a threat to the financial system—“Given Fortis Bank’s size, market share in the retail 
sector, and the prevailing crisis on the financial markets, the bank’s collapse would have 
given rise to a systemic risk to the financial sector” (European Commission (IP/08/1884). 
The Commission approved the Belgium/Luxembourg support package on December 3, 2008, 
also finding that the sale to BNP Paribas did not involve state aid since it paid a market price.  
Review by Belgian Court 
Shortly after the resolution plans were announced, Belgian shareholders of Fortis Group 
sued to stop the sale to BNP Paribas. On December 12, 2008, the Court of Appeal of Brussels 
decided that the sales to the Dutch and Belgian governments, as well as the subsequent 
agreement to sell to BNP Paribas, were not valid under Belgian law because they had not 
been submitted to the Fortis shareholders.13 This left the deal open to renegotiation. The 
shareholders initially rejected the resolution plans at meetings in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, but after certain transactions were changed, the plans were approved at a 























13 It is worth noting that the Belgian government opposed the ruling, and a controversy ensued when certain 
persons attempted to influence the court’s ruling and also to circumnavigate the ruling’s effect. In the country’s 
climate of political turbulence (which had already been agitated by the Dutch nationalization of part of Fortis), 
charges of interfering with the judiciary were brought, an investigation was undertaken, and ultimately the 
Minister of Justice, Prime Minister Leterme, and the government resigned over the Fortis affair (Blenkinsop 
2008). 
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Figure 7: Fortis Resolution Plan II as of October 5, 2008* 
Entity the Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg BNP Paribas (France) Fortis Group 
Investment 
€16.8 billion paid + 
€24 billion in short-
term and €16.1 billion 
in long-term loans 
assumed 
€4.7 billion + €4.7 







92.6% of Fortis Bank 
Nederland Holding, 
100% interest in Fortis 
Insurance Netherlands 
N.V., 100% interest in 
Fortis Corporate 
Insurance, and 70% 
interest in Fortis FBN 
(H) Preferred. In 
December 2008, 
acquired a 33.8% 
interest in the ABN 
AMRO assets held by 
the Fortis Group for an 
additional €6.54 billion. 
Additional shares of 
Fortis Banque 
Belgium, bringing its 
total interest to 
99.93%, 75% of 
which was to be sold 
to BNP Paribas for 




(9.83% of capital and 
12% of votes). Shares 




subsidiary to be 






became a 1.1% 
shareholder of 
BNP Paribas. 
75% of Belgian 
government 
interests in the 
Belgian bank 














































Key changes in the deal were: 
• BNP Paribas increased its price to €11.2 billion. 
• Belgium would retain a 25% blocking vote in Fortis Belgium.  
• Rather than acquire all of Belgium insurance business, Belgium acquired only 25%. 
• A redistribution of the cost of the Special Purpose Vehicle, now valued at €11.8 billion, 
o 11.76% (€1.39) share by BNP Paribas, 
o 43.53% (€5.13) by the Belgian government, and  
o 44.71% (€5.28) by Fortis Group (BNP Paribas 2009). 
EU State Aid Redux 
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In its December ruling, discussed above, the European Commission determined that the 
purchase of Fortis Insurance Nederland N.V. by the Dutch government did not constitute 
state aid. On April 9, 2009, the Commission opened a formal investigation into the question 
of state aid regarding the original nationalization of the Dutch bank, the subsequent 
purchase of the Dutch ABN AMRO banking assets (ABN AMRO Bank N.V.), the provision of 
tens of billions of euro in financing, and the plans of the government to merge the banks into 
a new entity (European Commission, IP/09/565). 
On February 8, 2010, the Commission temporarily approved the Dutch plans to merge the 
two banks as “urgent rescue aid,” while it continued to investigate the overall Dutch activities 
(European Commission, IP/10/138). In July 2010, the Dutch bank operations were merged 
to create the current ABN AMRO Group N.V. 
On April 5, 2011, the Commission finally approved all Dutch support activities as being “in 
line with EU rules that allow aid to remedy a serious disturbance in a member state’s 
economy” (European Commission, IP/11/406). As of October 2014, the Dutch government 
still owned ABN AMRO Group, which is an operating commercial bank, one with $533 billion 
in assets (SNL Financial). The government has indicated intent to sell the company to private 
investors sometime in the future. 
Meanwhile, the Fortis insurance operations (previously Fortis Holding) were not purchased 
by BNP Paribas but were renamed Ageas in 2010 and continue to operate out of their 
Brussels headquarters. 
BNP Paribas remains one of the largest banks in the world and survived the financial crisis 
fairly well, delivering profit of €3 billion in 2008 and €5.8 billion in 2009. It was ranked 4th 
overall on SNL Financial’s list of the world’s 100 largest banks with $2.512 trillion in assets 
(December 2013) (SNL Financial). 
7. Lessons Learned  
In March 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a committee of the Bank for 
International Settlements, issued Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank 
Resolution Group that included an analysis of the Fortis, Dexia (Belgium), Kaupthing 
(Iceland), and Lehman Brothers (US) resolutions. The report highlighted the shortcomings 
of the cross-border crisis resolution frameworks among the European member states and 
cited “group structure, liquidity and information sharing among supervisors as examples 
where improvements are needed” (Basel Committee 2010, 10). 
Specifically, with respect to the Fortis resolution the Committee made the following findings:  
• The Fortis case illustrates the tension between the cross-border nature of a group and 
the domestic focus of national frameworks and responsibilities for crisis 
management. This leads to a solution along national lines, which did not involve 
intervention through statutory resolution mechanisms; 
• The usefulness of formal supervisory crisis management tools appears to be limited 
in a situation where the institution needs to be stabilized rapidly and, at the same 
time, the continuity of business needs to be ensured in more than one jurisdiction. 
For example, some formal tools, when disclosed, can further undermine market 
confidence or may trigger termination and close-out netting events in financial 
contracts, with counterproductive effects; 
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• The Fortis case illustrates the tension between the need to maintain financial 
stability, for which a bank, under certain circumstances, needs to be resolved in the 
public interest and with public support, and the position of the shareholders of such 
a bank (i.e. dilution of their stake). Currently, Dutch and Belgian financial supervisory 
legislation does not permit effective special measures to be taken to resolve 
individual banks in a manner which maintains financial stability in urgent situations 
and which overrides the rights of shareholders;  
• Despite a long-standing relationship in ongoing supervision and information sharing, 
the Dutch and Belgian supervisory authorities assessed the situation differently. 
Differences in the assessment of available information and the sense of urgency 
complicated the resolution (Ibid., 11). 
The Committee’s recommendations informed the recent changes in EU bank supervision and 
resolution laws. These include EU-level supervision and resolution of significant cross-
border banks such as Fortis Group, utilizing a single rulebook of regulations and a uniform 
set of resolution tools, and increased cross-border cooperation and information sharing.  
It cannot be known what impact the new EU banking regulations would have had on Fortis’s 
situation. However, it seems likely that Fortis would have been designated a significant bank 
under the new Single Supervisory Mechanism, subject to direct supervision by the European 
Central Bank (working closely with the National Supervisory Authorities of its host’s 
countries). Since under the new regime there is a mandate to consider systemic risk issues, 
perhaps the ECB might not have approved the ABN AMRO deal in late 2007, or may have at 
least delayed it. 
If the merger had been approved, the rescue and resolution of Fortis might have gone 
differently under the Single Resolution Mechanism, with the original plan being adhered to 
and funded through the ECB, not subject to the whims of individual countries. At least, there 
would have been a mechanism in place to ensure that all interested parties were invited to 
any “war council,” so that, from the beginning, an arguably more collaborative and fairer 
process would have been employed.  
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